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Proprietary Mentality and the New Non-Profit
Corporation Laws
Howard L. Oleck*
N EW YORK'S NEW "Not-For-Profit Corporation Law" I statute is likely
to increase the abuse of non-profit status by many persons who
pretend to be governed by altruistic motives but who actually are mo-
tivated mainly by the desire to enrich themselves.-That is the unpalat-
able thesis of this paper.
Unhappily, I have seen so much abuse of non-profit and tax-exempt
status that I am very suspicious of anything that seems likely to en-
courage such abuse. If my suspicions are unjustified, nobody will be
more gratified than I.
But the new New York statute, that took effect on September 1,
1970, already was being studied as a model for a contemplated new
Pennsylvania statute in May of 1970,2 with action on the final report
scheduled for January 1971. Even before the revolutionary new statute
had been tested, it was being emulated. And, for example, the Ohio
Association of Colleges (numbering some 47 schools) queried me in
August 1970 about the effects and probability of emulation of the New
York statute in Ohio; and I had to say that it seems probable that
the new statute will be widely copied.
I believe that non-profit organization and activity, for mutual-and-
public-benefit, is the finest feature of American (or any other) society.
While altruism may not be the main force in most men's actions, it is
the best part. And today, there is a growing popular demand for a shift
in emphasis from profit-making activities to activities that aim mainly
at promotion of human welfare. Legislative action that instead may
serve to provide "social welfare coloration" to activities that actually
are selfish in purpose, ought to be scrutinized most carefully.
Naive as it may seem, I still am disturbed to see lawyers refer
quite cold-bloodedly to "the uses of charity" for personal gain.3 God
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Cleveland State University College of Law.
[Editors' Note: This paper is a consolidation of two papers delivered by Prof. Oleck
recently at a two-day seminar on the new New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law
statute, conducted in New York City by the Practising Law Institute.]
1 Chapter 35, Consolidated L. of N.Y.; Senate Bill Number 956-A (1969); Assembly
Bill Number 1690 (1969); signed into law by Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller on May 26,
1969, effective Sept. 1, 1970.
2 Tentative Report of the Sec. of Corp., Banking & Bus. L. of Penna. Bar Assn., on
Draft Legislation Revising and Codifying the Law Relating to Corps. Not-For-Profit
(Harrisburg., Penna., May 1970) [c/o Wm. P. Hackney, Esq. (committee chairman),
P.O. Box 2009, Pittsburgh, Penna., 152301.
3 See: Moore, Estate Planning Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969: The Uses of
Charity, 56 Va. L. Rev. 565 (May 1970).
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help us all if self-enrichment is to be clothed by law with the robe of
charity.
I do not doubt the good motives of the men who drafted the New
York statute. I do doubt the wisdom of their product. They concen-
trated on "lawyerlike" technique-and-procedure rules, at the expense
of conceptual legal architecture, though the foundation of non-profit
status law ought to be morality, not technique.
The new statute plays right into the hands of the man who views
his non-profit organization as a property (of his) rather than as a moral
obligation willingly assumed. This is a mistake that may have dire
consequences for our society.
The main reason offered for the adoption of New York's new non-
profit "business" corporation law is said to be that it will enable non-
profit organizations to build housing for the poor, etc., by attracting
business capital investments for profit. But New Jersey's Limited-Divi-
dend Non-Profit Housing Corporations or Associations Law, for example,
accomplishes the same purpose without throwing away centuries of ex-
perience of the dangers of inviting abuse of non-profit status.4 Even the
"reason" for the new-morality law is unconvincing.
Proprietary Mentality
Officers or employees who think that they "own the organization"
are found in many business companies. In some cases they are correct;
where, for example, the officer is the controlling stockholder in a business
corporation. But the same human phenomenon is seen, all too often,
in non-profit organizations. And there, that kind of proprietary men-
tality is quite improper-even if the organization was founded and
funded entirely by "the owner." This is because a non-profit organiza-
tion is, by definition, one that nobody owns, in that nobody is supposed
to get from it any personal profit (in the pecuniary sense) such as
owners get from their property.4a
The proprietary mentality is most thoroughly improper and un-
healthy in non-profit organizations that have fallen under the domina-
tion of one or a very few domineering officers or employees or members.
It is all too common in such organizations, though seldom openly criti-
cized, usually because of fear of defamation suits or of reprisals, by the
dominating person or persons, against critics. Such danger of reprisal is
a very effective silencer. The ones in the best position to know of im-
proper domination usually are the employees of the organization, and
4 N.J. Stat. Anno., Tit. 55, c. 16-1 et seq. (1967); and see, Id. c. 14 J-1 et seq. (1967);
Tit. 40, c. 55 (1953); Tit. 55, c. 14 H (1949). An 8 percent profit is provided for, and
if that is not enough it should not pretend to have any charitable aspect.
4a See definitions in Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations, Organizations, and Associations,
Secs. 1, 2 (2d ed., 1965); Oleck, Non-Profit Types, Uses, and Abuses: 1970, 19 Clev.
St. L. Rev. 207, at 211 (May 1970). Control of business organizations by majority
stock vote, or by cumulative voting, is approved by statute in most states; see, e.g.,
Ohio Rev. Code Sec. 1701.55.
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they usually cannot afford to risk their jobs by openly stating un-
pleasant facts about their "employers." Third persons who are aware of
improper "ownership attitudes" in various organizations, seldom are
able or willing to prove such unedifying attitudes.
I make the above, rather bitter and cynical, broad statements on
the basis of over thirty years of intensive experience in and with many
kinds of non-profit organizations.
Obviously, written records of case decisions of such phenomena
are almost non-existent, because employees who have the courage to
criticize "the owners" usually soon cease to be employed in the organiza-
tions concerned. Nor do they usually bring lawsuits even when un-
justly fired or otherwise abused, because an employee or member who
attacks or sues a non-profit (especially a charitable) organization for
unkind or unfair treatment is simply wasting time and effort. The "own-
ers" hold the aces in the game, under our system of defamation tort
law and of scant or non-existent supervision or inspection by public
officers and agencies.5
This last, parenthetically, is the key element in abuse of non-profit
status. Privilege without scrutiny is fatally tempting to most people.
The history of abuse of the benefits of charitable status is long
and disheartening. Today, as in centuries past, the "trustees" (in the
generic sense of that term) can and do make the organization pay the
expenses of defending their abuses, while the one who questions the
abuses usually pays out of his own pocket for his concern about pro-
priety and morality.0 The history of occasional (and futile) public in-
vestigations of abuses of charitable status is long and terribly depressing
to everyone except the persons who abuse that status.7
Even in the time of Queen Elizabeth the First, of England, the prev-
alence of abuse of trust in charitable activities was common enough to
require legislative action. The preamble to The Statute of Elizabeth I,
in 1601, said:
5 See, Gray, State Attorney-General, Guardian of Public Charities?!?, 14 Clev.-Mar.
L. Rev. 236 (1965); Oleck, op. cit. supra n. 4, at Secs. 158, 187; Bogert, State Super-
vision of Charities, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 639 (1954). See, as to a proposed system of self-
regulation of foundations only, Oleck article supra n. 4, at 19 Clev. St. L. Rev. 207,
at 234. "Ownership by management, in most non-profit organizations, is a flat con-
tradiction of the pro bono publico idea that is the essence of (proper) group activity
not for profit." Oleck, op. cit. supra, n. 1, at 313.
6 See, Lord Eldon's opinion in Corporation of Ludlow v. Greenhouse (1827), 1 Bli.
N.S.P.C., 17, 48; and Jones, History of the Law of Charity 1532-1827, at p. 161 (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 1969); Chester New, The Life of Henry Brougham 217, 218, 223,
224 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1961).
The public is concerned especially when tax or other benefits are enjoyed by
people who abuse tax-free status. See, DiMarco and Kane, Privileges and Immuni-
ties of Non-Profit Organizations, 19 Clev. St. L. Rev. 264 (1970).
7 E.g., Jones, op. cit. supra, n. 6 at 167; and see for example the Commission of 1818
(in England) described therein, and the next one in the 1840's, etc., down to the Mills
Committee and the resulting (U.S.) Tax Reform Act of 1969 described in Oleck
article supra n. 4 and in the Symposium in 19 Clev. St. L. Rev. (No. 2) 207-322 (May
1970).
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Whereas lands tenements rentes annuities, profittes hereditamentes,
goods chattels money and stockes of money, have been heretofore
given . . . , some for the reliefe of aged impotent and poore people,
some for the maintenance of sicke and maymed souldiers and mar-
riners, schooles of learninge, free schooles and schollers (etc.), ...
which lands tenements (etc.) nevertheless have not byn imployed
accordinge to the charitable intente of the givers and founders
thereof, by reason of fraudes breaches of truste and negligence in
those that should pay deliver and imploy the same .. 8
The Charities Act of 1960 in England repealed that preamble, but
did not change human nature and the tendency of many people to
treat trust property as their own.
With this caveat in mind, let us look quickly at the new New York
statute and see if it seems suitable in view of the probable attitude of
many people towards non-profit status vis-a-vis personal aggrandize-
ment.
The New New York Statute: General Provisions
First, we must notice the advertised idea that the new statute has
revealed a certain mystical differentiation between "non-profit" and
"not for profit." The P.L.I. circular announcement of its seminar on the
new law emphasized this idea.9 It said "the distinction between 'non-
profit' and 'not for profit' corporations, both as to functions and legal
rules governing them, is very real indeed." 10
In examining the alleged distinction I began by looking at all the
nonprofit organization law statutes of all the states. Alabama and Alaska
statutes speak only of "non-profit." Arkansas' statute says that non-
profit is not for profit; as a synonym, in effect. 1 Arizona and California
speak only of "non-profit." Colorado has a "Corporations Not For
Profit" Act, which means not for business nor for personal profit. 12
Connecticut is simply a "non-profit corporation law." Then Delaware
says "Corporations Not For Profit" and mixes those provisions right in
among those of its general business corporation statute. 13 And Florida
says "Corporations Not For Profit" means eleemosynary type organiza-
tions only.14
8 As to the history of the Act, subsequently, see generally, Jordan, Philanthropy in
England 1480-1660 (1959); and Marshall, The Charities Act, 1960 (1961) 24 M.L.R. 44,
445-446.
9 In the summer of 1970, titled "New York Not-For-Profit Corporations" (2 day
"course"), at which the speakers were the writer of this paper, Robert S. Lesher of
the law firm of Lesher, Howitt & Jenkins of Buffalo, N.Y., Prof. James K. Weeks
and Asst. Prof. Jon Bischel of Syracuse Univ. Law School, and Julius Greenfield, the
Chief of the Bureau of Charitable Foundations, N.Y. State Attorney-General's Office.
Lesher and Greenfield had participated in the drafting of the new statute.
10 At page 2 of the 6 page P.L.I. circular.
11 Ark. St. Sec. 64-1902.
12 Colo. Rev. St. Art. 19 Sec. 31-19-1.
13 Del. Gen. Corp. L. Art. 8 Sec. 141(e).
14 Fla. St., Ch. 617.
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There is hardly any need to labor the point. The alleged mystical
distinction, when examined, turns out to be nothing. There is no dis-
tinction, and the two terms are used interchangeably.
Next, we turn to the first sections of the new New York statute, 15
and see which provisions (if any) suggest a possibly erroneous approach
to, or misconception of, the true nature of, non-profit organization and
operation. Our approach, in my opinion, should be conceptual rather
than technical.
Section 102 (a) (4) speaks of "conducting of activities" as equivalent
to "doing of business" as that phrase is used in other statutes. This is
customary boilerplate, where careful distinction of business and of
non-profit concepts would have been wise.
Section 103 (a) excludes education, charitable or religious organiza-
tions; but then Section 201 (b) permits application to (Type B) chari-
table, educational, etcetera corporations. This is confusing, and raises
doubts.
Section 104 (d) (5) speaks of signatures (for incorporation, amend-
ment, etc.) "by a capital contributor not a member . . . (etc.) or his
successor in interest." This makes investor (dividend-business-type-
operation) an inherent and controlling feature of ostensibly non-profit
organizations. This is repugnant to the basic idea of public-service or
public-welfare organization.
Section 110 contains a boilerplate kind of severability provision, to
save what remains if (and when) a part of the statute be declared
void. This provision may well be necessary. At a seminar at Ann Arbor
recently, in speaking of the new New York statute, a former Internal
Revenue Service expert was queried about a possible collision between
the statute and the Tax Reform Act of 1969. He expressed the belief
that the I.R.S. would take a dim view of the New York statute.
Section 113 (b) says that all existing non-profit corporations must
file a certificate stating their class type (A, B, C, or D) under the
New York statute, and those not complying by September 1, 1973, "shall
be considered a Type B (charitable) Corporation until it has com-
plied .... " Then the Revisers' Notes say that this is meant to give "the
supreme court and the attorney-general (power) to regulate its ac-
tivities." But it gives charitable status to those who disobey the re-
quirement. What was proposed to be a control may well become a
shield for abuses.
Section 201 is the main new-idea provision, establishing four types
(A, B, C, and D) of non-profit corporation purposes, including types
C and D as business corporations. This looks like abandonment of
the concept of altruism as the underlying principle that justifies non-
profit status privileges. This section is ironically emphasized in the
New York Consolidated Laws Service volume by annotation with many
15 See, supra n. 1.
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case decisions forbidding business purposes in a non-profit organization.
The whole statute revolves around this section's definitions; and it
throws out the wisdom accumulated in centuries of experience in ex-
change for a most doubtful encouragement to "invest" for dividends
in money to be acquired in altruistic activities. I do not doubt that the
altruism soon will be mere lip service, and personal profit the real
motive (and almost sole motive), in many "Not-For-Profit" corporations
organized under this statute. And the beauty of it will be that this
motivation will be practically impossible to prove.
Section 202 (7) and (8) is another revolutionary innovation. It
permits "capital contributions or subventions . . ." by or to non-profit
organizations. It means that one may "invest" an endowment for chari-
table objectives, and then take back the endowment when desired. This
is a shocking idea, to me. It may intend to afford capital for desirable
public construction or the like; but it is almost certain to be used as
a device for self-enrichment primarily. More, it will encourage pyra-
miding and holding company control of operational companies by man-
agement (financier) companies (people), worse than the kind sought to
be controlled by the Holding Company Act of the 1930's.
Section 202 (12) permits directors to compensate themselves and
each other for merely being trustees (directors) even in charities, and
to indemnify .. . etc. This is a kind of encouragement hardly needed
by most humans. They surely will value themselves high. In good
morality, trustees should serve pro bono publico, not for fees, in public
service organizations, and especially in charities.
Section 202 (16) (b) allows big (over 20 million dollar) holdings,
and allows many far bigger concentrations. Yet, the "capitalization"
will not be easy to ascertain, by interested persons. This encourages
"giantism" in an area where it hardly is desirable.
Section 202 (d) permits corporations that are to hold park, educa-
tional, etc. "meetings" to appoint their own special policemen with
the powers of town constables, by mere filing of an oath with the county
clerk. This invites establishment of private armies ("police forces"), a
power too dangerous to be so casually granted to all takers. And Sec-
tion 202 (12) permits directors to pay themselves just for being directors,
even in charities. This verges on the indecent.
At this point the number of "trouble spots" in the New York statute
began to be so serious, right at the beginning of the lengthy statute, that
I stopped my section-by-section survey. I shall mention only a few
more points in it, before turning to the dangerous tendency in human
beings that may be the catalyst that makes this statute explosive in
the area of non-profit organization and operation.
Section 404 (a) eliminates from New York's statute one of its best
features respecting non-profit organization law-the requirement of
Jan. 1971
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scrutiny by a judge, of incorporation documents, etc. For some types
of corporations this requirement at least tended to restrain cynical
misuse of the non-profit form. The last thing that the non-profit field
should be given is reduction of supervision by public authorities. Many
people are suggesting that what is needed is a kind of S.E.C. to keep
non-profit operations honest, not reduction of supervision.
Section 907 also eliminates judicial supervision (for Class A corpo-
rations) of mergers; and Section 1002 (d) of dissolution-more reduc-
tions of supervision, instead of sorely necessary increases of supervision
by public authorities.
Section 203 eliminates ultra vires remedies except for certain limited
situations. This is business-type-corporation law. It encourages devious-
ness that is the very antithesis of the morality that should permeate non-
profit organization law.
Section 401 permits one man incorporation-the very opposite of
the idea of joint efforts of several (or many) people for the general
welfare. If this is not a cynical, it is a defeatist approach to law making.
Sections 504, 505 are the provisions that authorize subventions-
capital contributions that later may be taken back. Surely this is the
most outrageous legislative enactment of the century. The idea of
granting authority to obtain charitable gift status and then be free
to take back the "charity" is breathtaking. Comment is futile, for such
law.
Section 601 et seq. copy such business corporation devices as vot-
ing agreements (i.e., control agreements). This is a denial of the es-
sence of altruistic cooperation, and authorizes approvals by "votes cast"
at a meeting, etc. Here again is serious encouragement of the propri-
etary mentality and of use of charitable status for selfish purposes, by
activists rather than by majority rule. The results of this may be disas-
trous to the social need for cooperative work for honest public purposes.
Democracy may fail because so many people give lip service only. A fine
example of the result of the "votes cast" rule is the recent experience of
the American Bar Association Section of Legal Education: There, for
several years in a row, a small group of activists "packed" the meetings,
defeated committee proposals for improved standards of legal education,
and finally defeated an attempt to change the rules to prevent packing
of meetings. 16 Only a few members usually attend the meetings, though
only those present may vote.
Section 723 (b) permits indemnification and insurance as to directors
and officers who are convicted or who plead nolo contendere for wrong-
doing; and no presumption of bad faith may be read even from criminal
conviction. This is madness, it seems to me. I would call this pirates'
16 This last was in August 1970 at St. Louis. For details ask the Chairmen of the
Section (of 1965 to 1970).
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law. It is close kin to the recently adopted New York Business Corpora-
tion Law Section 727, which permits indemnification of cost of defense
even when final adjudication establishes active and deliberate dis-
honesty.
At this point I must stop. The statute calls to mind a saying of one
of my daughters, much used by her when she was very young and dis-
liked something fed to her: "Daddy, I fink I going to fwow up."
What Is Properly Proprietary?
Not all "proprietary" attitudes are improper. Nor is the terminology
of non-profit law and practice at all clear or precise on this point. Even
so-non-profit-sounding a term as "a private club" does not necessarily
mean one in which a proprietary mentality is improper. Such organiza-
tions as The Stork Club, Playboy Club, or other private business organi-
zations such as "night clubs," properly are proprietary businesses, and
can and do use names that sound non-profit but are well known to be
businesses. In England particularly, social or drinking clubs, very similar
to voluntary associations of members into clubs, often are businesses in
fact; but these are species quite distinct from the voluntary members'
groups that we usually associate with the word "club." 17 In final analy-
sis, if the "members" actually are customers, the club is a proprietary
business even if the patrons are called "members." 18 The relation of the
members of the club then is a contractual one, not as between members
perhaps, but as between members and the proprietor.19
But all this does not mean that a founder of a "charitable founda-
tion," even if he contributed all of its assets, is entitled to treat the
foundation as his property. Though the 1970 "Not-For-Profit-Corpora-
tion Law" of New York does permit business purposes 20 and even
(subventions) gifts to charity that may be taken back by the grantor, 21
the adoption of that law does not change the real nature of real non-
profit organization and operation.22 Even if we cannot legislate im-
morality out of existence, we do not have to legislate it into propriety.
17 See, Josling and Alexander, The Law of Clubs, 3-4 (Oyez Publications, London,
1964).
18 Ibid., p. 10.
19 Cassel v. Inglis (1916) 2 Ch. 211, at 221. Cf., as to members clubs, Josling and A.,
supra n. 17 at p. 11, citing cases.
20 Chap. 35, Consolid. L. of N.Y. (effective Sept. 1, 1970) Sec. 508, Types C and D,
expressly provide for business type operation of "non-profit" corporations.
21 Ibid. Secs. 501-521.
22 See, Oleck, Non-Profit Types, Uses and Abuses: 1970, in 19 Clev. St. L. Rev. 207,
231 (May 1970); but, cf., Weeks, The Not-For-Profit Business Corporation, in 19
Clev. St. L. Rev. 303 (May 1970). And see generally, Kutner, Legal Aspects of Char-
itable Trusts & Foundations (A Guide for Philanthropoids) esp. ch. V-c (Fiduciary
Duty of Trustees) pp. 197 et seq. (1970).
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Another Attack on Altruism
Another shock was sustained by American non-profit schools and
colleges in 1969 (and by many other non-profit organizations) when a
Federal District Court ruled that open proprietary operation does not
justify disaccreditation of a school--this, in flat contradiction of the
standards for most college and law school accreditation, for example.
This was a return to the dark ages, in the view of most educators. Court
support and legitimization of proprietary conduct in, let alone open
ownership of, "non-profit organizations with charitable functions," is
a dreadful misdirection of law.
Under the rules of the American Bar Association, for example,
proprietary conduct of officers of a law school is a ground for disaccredi-
tation. Its Standards state that a law school "shall not be operated
as a commercial enterprise . . . 24 Yet, the Federal District Court in
the case of Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Association
of Colleges and Secondary Schools25 had held that refusal of accredita-
tion on the ground that a college is not non-profit is improper. On ap-
peal, the Circuit Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, reversed.2
The American Bar Association and the Association of American Law
Schools had filed a joint brief Amicus Curiae in the appeal of that case,
urging that non-profit status be a "must" for higher education school
accreditation.
The Appeals Court said that if operators of colleges may make com-
mercial profits therefrom, standards other than academic and educa-
tional benefit to students are likely to become dominant. Business-type
operations are not governed by the same considerations as those in
non-profit organizations.
In this case, Bazelon, C.J., said: "The increasing importance of
private associations in the affairs of individuals and organizations has
led to a substantial expansion of judicial control over non-profit asso-
ciations. The extent of this judicial power must be related to the ne-
cessity for intervention." (Emphasis supplied.) 27
The 1969 tendencies in non-profit organization law make one al-
most despair of American law-morality. If charity-flavored self-enrich-
ment is legislated, we may as well stop all pretense that altruism is any-
thing but a myth.
23 Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Association of Colleges and Sec-
ondary Schools, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.C., D.C., 1969).
24 Standards of the A.B.A. for Legal Education, Sec. (1) (e) (as of Nov. 1, 1969)
[pamphlet published by Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, of
the A.B.A.].
25 Supra, n. 23.
26 --- F. 2d --- (C.A., D.C., June 30, 1970); 39 U.S. Law Week 2021 (July 14, 1970).
27 Ibid.
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Tax Exemption Mushrooms
Meanwhile, proponents of tax exempt status for many charitable
organizations are very voluble-arguing that the concept of tax exemp-
tion is not the equivalent of a public subsidy.28 To them, as one in-
terested in this field of law [but even more, as a taxpayer] I say, "Nuts."
If an organization does not pay taxes, but gets the protections and
services for which I pay as a taxpayer, it is being subsidized by me
and the other taxpayers. I do not accept the argument that they all
are doing something for which the government otherwise would have
to pay. Tax exemptions now are becoming a terrible burden on those
who do pay taxes.2 9 Merely as one example, I mention the city of
Cleveland, where now one out of every three dollars of real estate is
tax exempt, and since 1965 the taxable real estate has dropped by $80
million while the tax exempt realty has increased by more than $82
million.30 And the story is worse in other places.
Even the United States Supreme Court is bemused (to use a politer
term than "intimidated") by the power of tax exempt churches, for
example, into such "logic" as the recent Walz case decision.3 1 In that
case the Court said, in effect, that because we so long have not labelled
tax exemption of churches as a public subsidy, we therefore must
continue longer. In the field of tax exempt church organizations, the
proprietary mentality thus is encouraged to build ever-more-lofty
castles. This may not offend the First Amendment to the Constitution
(at least so said most of the Supreme Court Justices), but it offends
common sense, not to mention one's sense of elementary justice. The
Court triumphantly pointed to the fact that tax exemption has not yet
led to "an establishment of (any) religion" by the State. But it left
unanswered the plaintiffs' objections that their tax monies were being
used to benefit churches to which they do not belong; or, worse yet,
compelled non-believers (agnostics, atheists, etc.) to support religious
organizations. Thank God (get that expression, dear reader), even
atheists are free not to believe in God in this country; and I say "Amen"
to that.
28 See, for example, Bittker, Churches, Taxes, and the Constitution, 78 Yale L.J. 1285
(1969).
29 See, for some statistics, Oleck article supra n. 4, at 228.
30 Cleveland Plain Dealer, p. AA1 (Aug. 30, 1970).
31 Walz v. Tax Commissioner of City of N.Y., 90 S. Ct. 1409 (1970), 38 U.S. Law Week
4347 (May 4, 1970), following 90 S. Ct. 149, 259 (1969), following 395 U.S. 957, 89
S. Ct. 2105, and facts in 30 A.D. 2d 778, 292 N.Y.S. 2d 353, 24 N.Y. 2d 30, 298 N.Y.S. 2d
711, 246 N.E. 2d 517.
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Inherent "Ownership" Rights of Members
Ultimate "ownership" of a non-profit organization and of its assets
is in the members, in a membership organization. The member's right
to vote is his basic means of control. In organizations such as labor
unions or professional-accreditation societies, where membership is a
necessity in order to earn a living at the trade, the courts often now
recognize a property-right kind of interest of members. 32 In social
groups a property-right in assets is generally recognized. 33 The same
is 'true of trade association type groups.34 It even has been extended
to assets of independent church entities.3 5 Yet, this recognition has
been grudging and not unanimous; and it often has been denied, particu-
larly to unincorporated associations. 36 Since 1947 there has been wide-
spread acceptance of the idea that members' rights in non-profit or-
ganizations are inherent natural rights.37
Of course, members' rights are limited by the contract of mem-
bership, and its usual requirement of submission to bylaws and in-
ternal rules.38 The practical facts of life, about the holding of control
by well-known "labor bosses," in flat violation of members' rights some-
times, are well known.39 And the actualities of racial and other discrim-
ination against members and would-be members of labor unions and
other non-profit organizations are well known. 40
Rights in organizations consisting solely of trustees are treated as
if the trustees are members.4 1
32 Falcone v. Middlesex County Med. Assn., 34 N.J. 582, 170 A. 2d 791, 799 (1961);
DeMille v. American Federation of Radio Artists, 31 Calif. 2d 139, 187 P. 2d 769
(1947); Smith v. Kern County Med. Assn., 19 Calif. 2d 263, 120 P. 2d 874 (1942);
Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc. of Orthodontists, 83 Calif. Rptr. 623, 460 P. 2d 495
(1969).
33 Waugaman v. Skyline Country Club, 227 Ala. 495, 172 S. 2d 381 (1965).
34 See, Oleck, op. cit. supra, n. 4, at 35, citing Wallick v. Intnat'l. Union, etc., 90 Ohio
L. Abs. 584, 36 Ohio Bar (17) 584 (1963), which used the concept of conspiracy in
a labor union assault liability case.
35 Randolf v. First Baptist Church, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 100, 120 N.E. 2d 571 (1945).
36 See, State ex rel. Givens v. Superior Court of Marion County, 233 Ind. 235, 117
N.E. 2d 553 (1954); and, Oleck, op. cit. supra, n. 4, at chap. 3.
37 Berrien v. Politzer, 83 App. D.C. 23, 165 F. 2d 21 (1947).
38 Ginossi v. Samatos, 3 Ill. App. 2d 514, 123 N.E. 2d 104 (1954); Oklahoma Assn. of
Ins. Agents v. Hudson, 385 P. 2d 453 (Okla. 1963). And this limitation is permitted
by such statutes as 25 Calif. Code, Sec. 9301; Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 1702.20 (i.e., one
vote per member unless otherwise provided).
39 Read your daily newspapers and news journals, wherever you live.
40 See, Pasley, Exclusion and Expulsion From Non-Profit Orgns.-The Civil Rights
Aspect, 14 Clev-Mar. L. Rev. 203 (1965). But truly private groups, "not affected with
a public interest" may be exclusive if they wish. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
And see, Pinsker case, supra, n. 32; Everett v. Riverside Hose Co. No. 4, Inc., 261 F.
Supp. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See, as to power to refuse membership, Packel, Organi-
zation and Operation of Cooperatives, Sec. 19 (ALI-ABA, 1970).
41 Ohio Rev. Code, Secs. 1702.14, 1719.01.
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Officers' Proper Powers i
Officers (and this includes trustees, executive secretaries, etc.)
of non-profit organizations are in a fiduciary relation (at least) to their
organizations and their members. No ownership is reposed in them.
Yet, they must use only reasonable judgment and good faith.42 Their
conduct in exceeding the proprieties in the actions of the organization
(e.g., ultra vires acts), may be questioned, today in most states, only
by (1) the State, (2) the corporation itself against an officer, or (3)
a member against an officer or other member.43
Improper conduct or decisions by trustees may be enjoined by
petition of other trustees.44 But such public collisions of trustees rarely
are seen.
Special limitations on trustee powers are found in some states in
some types of organizations. Thus, in Ohio, in non-profit educational
corporations, trustees are forbidden to receive any compensation or
benefit, directly or indirectly, except that they may freely visit the
premises of the institution or organization. 45 This rule is honored in the
breach as often as in obedience, in many cases.
Officers and Committees and Control
Committees do much of the most important work of non-profit or-
ganizations, far more than in business organizations. The committee
fundamentally is an administrative, not an executive, device. It often
is a technique for research or supervision, in theory. It is not essentially
a repository of executive power-though it often has such power. The
committee ordinarily is an assistance to the executive officers. It is not
itself the executive-at least it is not supposed to be.
Nevertheless, actual management or decision of a matter may be
entrusted to a committee. In one case40 not long ago a committee that
had autonomy (e.g., a welfare fund or grievance committee for several
branches of the organization) was allowed to be sued as an entity, under
its own name. Delegation of any authority of the trustees, to an execu-
tive committee, for example, is specifically permitted by statute in
many states.47 Usually statutes permit the bylaws to provide for com-
mittees and their authority.4s
42 Oleck, op. cit. supra n. 4, at Sec. 159.
43 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 1702.12(H). And see, Oleck, op. cit. supra, n. 4, at Sec. 54.
44 Holt v. College of Ost. Physicians & Surg., 61 Calif. 2d 750, 394 P. 2d 932 (1964).
45 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 1713.30.
46 Marsh v. General Grievance Committee, 1 Ohio St. 2d 165, 205 N.E. 2d 571 (1965).
47 Ohio Rev. Code Sec. 1702.33.
48 Ibid., Sec. 1702.11(A) (8). See also, Grange, Corporation Law for Officers & Di-
rectors, c. 35 (1940); Prentice-Hall, Directors' & Officers Encyc. Manual, 103 (1955).
See also, the statutes of Mass. (Sec. 156.13), N.Y. Not-For-Profit Corp. L. (Sec. 712),
Mich. (Sec. 450, 13), Fla. (Sec. 618.12), Calif. Corps. (Sec. 9401).
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In general, there is an inherent power, in the board and in officers,
to delegate to committees the performance of administrative (minis-
terial) acts. 49 This means the study of any matter, or even the man-
agement of routine matters.50 Management of the organization's rou-
tine affairs may be entrusted to a committee, as well as to an officer or
agent. 51 There is nothing inherently wrong in this. Even the doing
of such important executive acts as the making of contracts or leases
may be delegated to a committee.5 2 Power to delegate authority ordi-
narily is not clearly defined in most non-profit corporation statutes,
except as to the executive committee.5 3
Although the power to delegate administrative duties is clear, the
power to delegate discretionary (executive) duties or powers is not.
The board of directors may not freely give away the discretionary
power inherent in it.5 Yet, they too often do just that.
The power to delegate even discretionary authority to some extent
is an inherent power of the directors and officers. How far it extends
depends on the necessity for the delegation, the nature of the duties
involved, and the reasonableness of the delegation. 55 In theory this
power is used cautiously.
Certain powers may not be delegated at all. Statutes, the charter,
and the bylaws may (and do) confer certain powers expressly (or by
implication) on specific officers or on the board.50 The board of directors,
for example, may not completely turn over to others the power to
exercise the authority of the board. The appointment of even an execu-
tive committee (see below) must not amount to an abandonment of
board powers to that committee.5 7 At least that is what the law says.
What very often happens in actuality is a very different thing.
49 See, Schulte v. Ideal Food Pdts. Co., 208 Iowa 767, 226 N.W. 174 (1929).
50 See, Note, The Executive Committee in Corporate Organization-Scope of Powers,
42 Mich. L. Rev. 133 (1943).
51 See, Wallace v. International Trade Exhibition, Inc., 170 La. 55, 127 S. 362 (1930).
52 Holwick v. Walker, 6 Calif. App. 2d 699, 45 P. 2d 374 (1935).
53 See below.
54 Social Security Board v. Warren, 142 F. 2d 974 (D.C., 1944). But a grant of pow-
ers may be implied as well as express. Hahnemann Hospital v. Golo Slipper Co., 135
Penna. Super. 395, 5 A. 2d 605 (1939).
55 See, Dewey v. Natl. Tank Maint. Corp., 233 Iowa 58, 8 N.W. 2d 593 (1943).
56 Lane v. Bogert, 116 N.J. Eq. 454, 174 A. 217 (1934); Farmers' Gin Co. v. Kasch,
277 S.W. 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
57 Note, The Executive Committee in Corporate Organization-Scope of Powers, 42
Mich. L. Rev. 133 (1943).
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Continued Responsibility of the Delegating Authority
When the board, or the officers, delegate authority to committees
or agents, they continue to be responsible for the proper exercise of
this authority.58 They must maintain a general supervision over the
exercise of the powers that they have delegated.59 If they negligently
permit the delegate to abuse the delegated powers, they may be liable
for the consequences of that abuse.60 Cases of such negligence being
punished, however, are very rare indeed.
Appointment of Committees or Executives
Fundamentally, the power to delegate authority to officers or com-
mittees springs from the board of trustees. The board often vests this
power (the power to appoint committees or agents) in the president.
Often the charter or bylaws give express powers of this kind to the
president or to other officers. But the power continues to reside in the
board. Any such power not expressly placed elsewhere by the charter
and bylaws, or by statutes, lies in the board.6 1
The power of the board to delegate authority is most dramatically
expressed by the appointment of the executive committee. Statutes in
many states now expressly recognize this power; but they often require
that it be stated in the bylaws.6 2 With or without such statutes, the
appointment of even such a powerful committee is valid. 3
Appointment of an Executive Secretary or Executive Director is
common; but such officers are employees primarily, and not policy
makers in theory. In practice the Executive Secretary often tends to
develop a proprietary attitude towards the organization that employs
him.
Executive Committee Powers
Use of executive committees by non-profit as well as by business
organizations now is widespread. 4 Delegation of managerial authority
also often is made to officers,1' 5 or even at times to persons having no
58 Martin v. Hardy, 251 Mich. 413, 232 N.W. 197 (1930).
59 Ibid.
60 See, Hoit & Co. v. Detig, 320 Ill. App. 179, 50 N.E. 2d 602 (1943).
61 See the foregoing sections.
62 N.Y. (old) Memb. Corp. L. Sec. 20 (for all non-profit corporations) and Secs. 141,
142 (for YMCA and YWCA state executive committees). This statute has been re-
placed by the new (1970, Sept.) statute.
63 Harris v. Harris, 137 Misc. 73; 241 N.Y.S. 474 (1930).
64 See, 2 Oleck, Modem Corporation Law, Sec. 958 (1965 supp.); Comment, Corpo-
rate Management by an Executive Committee, 25 Albany L. R. 93 (1961).
65 Hoyt v. Thompson's Exr., 19 N.Y. 207 (1859).
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affiliation with the organization.60 In non-profit organizations, delega-
tion of such power may not be given to outsiders; indeed, statutes to-
day often require that the members of the executive committee must
be trustees.
7
The power of the board of directors or trustees to appoint an
executive committee is an inherent one. 8 So, generally, is the power
to delegate authority to officers and agents as well."
The executive committee is a kind of sub-board of directors, and
normally should act as a unified or collective group. Yet, lack of a
formal meeting does not invalidate its actions, if the members later agree
in writing to a decision reached without a meeting.7 0 In general, the
executive committee is subject to the same rules that apply to the trus-
tees or directors.7 1
Complete abdication of the board, by transfer of its powers to the
executive committee, is improper. 72 Thus, surrender of board powers
to a management company for twenty years was held to be against
public policy.78 Yet, a five-year grant of complete authority over edi-
torial policy, to an editor of a newspaper, was held to be valid.7 4
Ordinarily, the charter or bylaws (usually the bylaws) may (and
do) set forth the power to appoint an executive committee, and the rules
regarding exercise of this power.75 Some statutes (e.g., California and
New York) state that the articles or bylaws may, provide for an execu-
tive committee.70 Others (e.g., Minnesota and Ohio) state that directors
may appoint an executive committee unless the articles or bylaws pro-
vide otherwise. 77
60 See, In re Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 6 F. 2d 192 (2d Cir., 1925); contra: Long
Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E. 2d 633;
Noted, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1251 (1948).
67 Use of directors from other corporation is improper. 1955 Op. Attny. Gen. (N.Y.)
Mar. Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 1702.33 requires that executive committee members be
trustees.
68 McNeil v. Boston Chamber of Commerce, 154 Mass. 277, 28 N.E. 245 (1891); Harris
v. Harris, 137 Misc. 73, 241 N.Y.S. 474 (1930); and see, Gordon, Business Leadership
in the Large Corporations 46 et passim (Brookings Institute, 1945).
69 Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 39 S.W. 486, 490 (1897); San Antonio Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Taylor, 129 Tex. 335, 105 S.W. 2d 650, 654 (1937).
70 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 1702.33(D); Caldwell v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn.,
53 A.D. 245, 65 N.Y.S. 826 (1900).
71 Wingate v. Bercut, 146 F. 2d 725 (9th Cir. 1944).
72 Lane v. Bogert, 116 N.J. Eq. 454, 174 A. 217 (1934).
73 Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana Mut. Casualty Co., 41 F. 2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert.
den., 282 U.S. 893, 51 S. Ct. 107, 75 L. Ed. 787 (1930).
74 Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 39 S.W. 486 (1897).
75 See n. 62, above.
76 Anno. Calif. Corp. Code, Sec. 9401; N.Y. Not For Profit Corp. L., Sec. 712 (1970).
77 Minn. Stat. Anno. Sec. 317.20; Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 1702.33.
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An executive committee usually is empowered to exercise all of
the power of the board of directors at times when the board is not in
session. In theory it is supposed to execute the policy of the board in
routine affairs during intervals between board meetings. Almost in-
variably it consists of a number of the directors themselves, or of a
combination of directors and officers. It must follow the general direc-
tions of the board.
7s
The executive committee may manage routine affairs, but may
not lawfully take extraordinary or drastic action, such as liquidating the
organization, on its own discretion.79 Also, it ordinarily may not run
corporate affairs for an unduly long period without meetings or de-
cision by the board itself.8s In fact, the authorization for the appoint-
ment of an executive committee (the bylaw, charter provision, or
resolution) is invalid if it fails to set reasonable limits on the authority
of the committee. 8 '
This committee, like all committees, must act by a quorum, and by
majority vote, unless other provisions are expressly made.8 2 It may
not again further delegate its powers-not even to one of its own mem-
bers.8 3
Calling a meeting of the board of directors suspends the power of
the executive committee to act until after the meeting of the board
s4
If an executive committee deals with third persons, the usual rules of
express, implied, and apparent authority of agents apply, If, for
example, the corporation impliedly ratifies the unauthorized act of the
committee, by accepting its benefits, the corporation will be estopped
from later denying the committee's authority to do that act.SO
The committee may validly act only within the limits of its real
purpose-interim supervision. Thus, it may not change the officers or
their salaries, amend bylaws, or expel or change committee members s 7
78 Wallace v. International Trade Exhibition, Inc., 170 La. 55, 127 S. 362 (1930), Tem-
pel v. Dodge, 89 Tex. 69; 32 S.W. 514; 33 S.W. 222 (1895); First Natl. Bk. v. Commer-
cial Tray. Home Assn., 108 A.D. 78; 95 N.Y.S. 454; affd., 185 N.Y. 575; 78 N.E. 1103
(1906); Note, The Executive Committee in Corporate Organization-Scope of Powers,
42 Mich. L. Rev. 133 (1943).
79 See n. 61 above; and see, Fensterer v. Pressure Lighting Co., 85 Misc. 621; 149
N.Y.S. 49 (1914); Lawrence v. Atlantic P. & P. Corp., 298 F. 246 (D.C. 1924).
8o See, Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana Mut. Cas. Co., 41 F. 2d 588 (7th Cir. 1930);
see above, n. 73, 74.
81 See, Ryder v. Bushwick R. Co., 134 N.Y. 83; 31 N.E. 251 (1892).
82 Marshall v. Industrial Federation of America, 84 N.Y.S. 866 (1903); Puerifoy v.
Loyal, 154 S.C. 267; 151 S.E. 579 (1930); but see, above, n. 69.
83 Caldwell v. Mutual Reserve Fund L. Assn., 53 A.D. 245; 65 N.Y.S. 826 (1900).
84 See, Commercial Wood & C. Co. v. Northampton P. C. Co., 190 N.Y. 1; 82 N.E. 730
(1907).
85 See Oleck, op. cit. supra, n. 4, at c. 22, 23.
86 See, Respass v. Rex Spining Co., 191 N.C. 809; 133 S.E. 391 (1926).
87 Tempel case, n. 78, above; Hayes v. Canada, A. & P.S.S. Co., Ltd., 181 F. 289 (C.A.
1, 1910).
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But if the power to fix salaries, or some other such routine discretionary
power, is given to the committee by the board, it may validly exercise
such a power.8 8
It should be clear that the functions and powers of an executive
committee depend on the charter and bylaw provisions, on statutory
limitations that require action by the directors themselves in certain
matters, and on the purpose for which the committee was established.
Its powers largely are those implied in, or necessary to, the purpose
for which it was formed, as declared in the bylaw or resolution for its
formation.89 Attempts of executive committees to usurp control, and
to exclude some of the board members from this control, have been
called quite possible "dangerous to the democracy of a cooperative" or
other non-profit group, and are uniformly condemned.90 Yet, in practice
I have seen such committees ignore the law without hesitation, again
and again.
Examples of Executive Committee Structure
A few current illustrations show how executive committees are
(or, are not) used, to serve the proper purposes of such devices. All
these examples are proper ones, and are from Cleveland organizations,
as of summer of 1970, and were obtained by inquiry by a student in
a Seminar on Non-profit organizations, run by the writer.
Insurance Board of Cleveland: 12 trustees on the Board of Trustees;
a 5 member executive committee, one a non-member who serves in
an advisory capacity only.
Cleveland Touchdown Club (boosters for the Cleveland Browns
Club, and to encourage interscholastic football): 15 trustees on the
Board of Trustees; no provision for an executive committee, and no
such committee.
Cleveland Conference of Laymen (Catholic religion and education):
Charter calls for 9 to 40 trustees; at present there are 16. An executive
committee is provided for, with maximum of 15 members.
Garfield Memorial Church: 18 member Board of Trustees; no pro-
vision for an executive committee, and no such committee.
Cleveland Chapter, Society for Property and Liability Under-
writers: Has an executive committee of 7 members, all being directors,
and 4 of them are respectively the president, vice-president, secretary,
and treasurer.
88 Wallace case, n. 78, above; Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635; 197 S.W. 376, 382
(1916); San Antonio Joint C.S. Bk. v. Taylor, 129 Tex. 335; 105 S.W. 2d 650 (1937).
89 See, Wingate v. Bercut, 146 F. 2d 725 (CA. 9, 1944).
90 See, Packel, Organization & Operation of Cooperatives, 137 (4th ed., 1970); and see
Hayes case, n. 87, above; Robinson v. Benbow, 298 F. 561, 570 (C.C.A. 4, 1924).
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St. Luke's Hospital of Cleveland (Methodist Church): Maximum
of 36 trustees, but actual number each year is set by the annual meeting
of members. Executive committee, of trustee members, to be not less
than 5 nor more than 12 members. In this kind of (hospital) operation,
the need for every-day decisions results in the executive committee be-
ing an integral part of the operation of the organization.
"Control Agreements" and Executive Committees
The new New York statute expressly permits control agreements. 91
This will make unnecessary the devious (and improper) methods hith-
erto employed, such as these:
Attempts by a few members to fasten their personal control onto a
non-profit corporation often have revolved about the executive com-
mittee. In business corporations, perpetuation of control can be ac-
complished by stockholders' and pre-incorporators' agreements, voting
trusts, and other devices.92 But in non-profit corporations, the execu-
tive committee often is deemed to be the best device. Attempts to con-
trol are, of course, contrary to the proper purpose of non-profit organiza-
tions in society. Seizure of power is hard to accomplish if any organized
resistance is offered.
When the incorporators draft the charter and bylaws to suit
themselves and elect themselves to the board of directors and to the
executive committee, they can grasp control. But the next elections
may oust them. And the members can at any time amend the bylaws
or even the charter. Attempts to enforce discriminatory, or control-pur-
pose rules cannot overcome a vigorous defense of members' rights.
Also, the very presence of oligarchic rules in the charter or bylaws may
defeat their own purpose. Few members may join or long remain in
an organization after they discover such rules.
Control of Dual Power Groups
An interesting device for gaining or holding control of charitable
corporations (i.e., schools or hospitals) is use of dual power control
groups. Thus, a school or hospital often needs no membership, under
modern statutes, other than the board of trustees. The board, in such
organizations, literally holds the corporation's property in trust for
the corporate purposes.
By forming a non-profit corporation with a few members, plus a
91 N.Y. Not-For-Profit Corp. L. Secs. 601 et seq. See comment on it, above, in the
summary of the N.Y. statute's "sick points."
92 See, Oleck, New York Corporations, Secs. 34, 43, 45, 399, 417 (1961 supp. ed.);
3 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law, c. 58 (1965 supp.).
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board of trustees most of whom are not members, two power groups
are created. They tend to neutralize each other, both often performing
their duties perfunctorily. The "managers" provide for granting of con-
trol power to themselves as officers, usually placing themselves in the
members group. If they are trustees they often are not supposed to get
any salaries or compensation. 93
Often the "managers" have themselves appointed as the executive
committee, by the trustees, who are grateful for the honor of being
appointed as trustees of a public service organization. Trustees too often
enjoy their status and avoid actual work, as I well know. I have seen
them, more than once, simply resign when asked to do any actual
work, or devote any actual time to their duties.
Where statutes require members of the executive committee to be
trustees, as many do,94 the title of administrative committee, or the like,
is employed. Or, the bylaws simply grant wide powers to the officers
(the "managers"). The trustees then are subordinated to the managing
members, as the members have final amendment powers. The members
are kept content with jobs in administration, salaries, or other favors
from the organization's managers. Trustees' and members' meetings
are called as seldom as possible, and are perfunctory.
The officers or administrative committee often run such an organiza-
tion well, in practice. But the evasion of the principle of control of
operations by a disinterested board is unhealthy. Probably, in such a
device, the members could be deemed to be a class of trustees, and thus
not entitled to compensation, as noted above, in case of challenge of
the managerial group. Such challenges are surprisingly seldom offered.
This device is typical of the "proprietary mentality" in non-profit
organizations. A determined board of trustees, of course, can upset
such a plan by exercising its statutory powers. So, too, the members can
upset it by amending the articles or bylaws. Such seizure of power, of
course, may lead to destruction of the organization. Sometimes, indi-
vidual lethargy or self-interest allows the aggressive managerial group
to remain in power indefinitely.
Another major device for control, often used in conjunction with
an executive committee instrumentality, is the power to change the
articles or bylaws. This usually is provided for in the original incorpo-
ration papers or bylaws. The power to change the size or composition
of the board of trustees is a crucial one in control of the organization. 5
93 Ohio Rev. Code Sec. 1713.30.
94 Ibid. Sec. 1702.33(A).
95 See, Taft, Control of Foundations and Other Non-Profit Organizations, 18 Clev-
Mar. L. Rev. 478 (1969).
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Lawsuits to Discipline Errant Management
Assets contributed to non-profit (and especially, charitable) or-
ganizations, must be devoted to the announced purposes of the organiza-
tion which drew forth the contributions-not to what the managers
sua sponte decide or prefer.') The rules governing charitable trusts
are applicable, and there is a duty to follow the declared purposes, and
not to divert assets to other uses-and this duty is supposed to be en-
forced by the attorney-general of the state9 7 The actual lack of super-
vision and enforcement by attorneys-general is one of the major fea-
tures of the "utility" of non-profit organizations as devices for personal
enrichment (usually tax-free, too) Ys Attorneys-general and their al-
most studied blindness to blatant abuses, are shocking and persistent
phenomena, in this regard, in American society.9 9 A hopeful develop-
ment is the New York addition of a 9-attorney and 7-accountant staff
in the Non-Profit section of the Secretary of State's office. California,
too, seems to have improved its facilities.
But the provision that the attorney-general is a "necessary" party
in actions concerning charitable trusts ought not to be viewed as ex-
clusive. The attorney-general ought to be viewed as an additional party,
not as the only one who can bring action.10 0 The requirement that only
he act for the public has vitiated the adoption in about ten states' 01 of
the "Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act"
of 1954; the Act omits educational, religious and hospital organizations,
anyhow.102
While the Restatement of Trusts (2d) says that a contributor has
no standing to sue, having parted with his property, 10 3 that is clearly
an unsound and unhealthy view, and should not be the law. Such a
rule is an open invitation to hypocritical abuse of charitable organiza-
tion status. Fortunately, the Restatement is not law.
It is well settled that trustees who object (e.g., a minority) may
sue to enjoin actions by other trustees that are improper.10 4 And a
96 St. Joseph's Hospital v. Bennett, 281 N.Y. 115, 22 N.E. 2d 305 (1939).
97 Restatement of Trusts (2d), Sec. 348; Ohio Rev. Code, Secs. 109.23-99 (1964). In
N.Y. and California, reasonably adequate staffing seems to have been added recently.
98 See, Gray, State Attorney-General--Guardian of Public Charities?!?, 14 Clev-
Mar. L. Rev. 236 (1965).
99 "In sum, the present state of charitable trust enforcement is wholly inadequate.",
Note, Charitable Trust Enforcement . . . , 56 Va. L. Rev. 716, at 724 (May 1970).
100 See, Ohio Rev. Code, Secs. 109.23-.99 (1964).
101 Calif., Ill., Mich., N.Y., Ore., etc.
102 See, Handbook of Natl. Conf. of Commrs. on Unif. State Laws 169-72 (1954).
103 Restatement of Trusts (2d), Sec. 391 (1959); Holden Hospital Corp. v. Southern
Illinois Hospital Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 150, 174 N.E. 2d 793 (1961).
104 St. James Church v. Superior Court, 135 Calif. App. 2d 352, 287 P. 2d 387 (1955);
Note, Capacity of Charitable Corporation to Sue Co-Trustees to Enjoin Breach of
Trust, 16 Hastings L. J. 479 (1965); Note, Trusts: Gifts to Charitable Corporation-
Nature of Interest Created-Duties of Trustees, 26 So. Calif. L. Rev. 80 (1952).
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recent Ohio decision clearly indicates that others may bring, or join in
(as interested parties), actions to prevent boards of trustees (and, cer-
tainly, individuals) from misusing their powers. 10 5 In that case, an
action was brought against a controlling group of a hospital administra-
tion (and board) by a group of staff and affiliated physicians, and by a
medical society, joined by a local social welfare organization, and
(when its inaction became noticeable), later, by the office of the at-
torney-general. The basis of action was the fact that public canvass
had raised funds, not very long before, for the building of a major part
of the hospital facilities.10 That hospital was ordered into receivership
in the Fall of 1970.107
The standing-to-sue of these various "parties" was recognized,
in practice; and in June 1970 they had moved to have the hospital put
into receivership in order to prevent an announced trustees' (5 to 4)
decision to sell the hospital to a business corporation hospital-operation
enterprise."" Yet, a recent New Jersey case still had held (only a
few months earlier) that a taxpayer could not prevent the moving away
of a hospital.'0 9 The blindness of some courts, and their worshipful
deference to the title of "charitable," is almost incredible for men who
are supposed to be worldly wise.
Some Horrible Examples
After more than a third of a century of law practice, much activity
as organizer, counsel, officer, member, researcher and student, etc., of,
in, and around, many non-profit organizations, I have come to a very
ugly conclusion, namely that:
PROBABLY HALF OF ALL NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
ARE RUN BY INDIVIDUALS OR SMALL GROUPS (VERY OF-
TEN ALMOST CONSPIRATORIAL IN NATURE) WHO ARE
INTERESTED AND ACTIVE SOLELY OR ALMOST SOLELY IN
THEIR OWN PROFIT OR ADVANTAGE THEREFROM, WHILE
THEY LOUDLY PROCLAIM THEIR ALTRUISM.
If this makes me seem to be a cynic and patently a believer in
the inherently animal nature of man-the answer is "Yes, I am-God
help me."
105 Matthews v. Ingleside Hospital, Inc., 254 N.E. 2d 923 (Ohio Com. Pleas Ct., Cuya-
hoga Co., case No. 873358-1969). And see, Goshien, Relocation of Publicly Supported
Charitable Organization, 19 Clev. St. L. Rev. 316 (1970).
106 See, Cleveland Plain Dealer, p. 1 (Sept. 25, 1965); Cleveland Press (editorial)
(Oct. 24, 1968).
107 Ibid., Plain Dealer (Sept. 2, 1970); and p. 12 (Oct. 3, 1970).
108 Cleveland Plain Dealer, p. 5C (June 13, 1970).
109 City of Paterson v. Paterson General Hospital, 250 A. 2d 427 (N.J. 1969), appl.
dism. 251 A. 2d 131 (N.J. 1969).
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Let me cite a very few, very typical examples from my own expe-
rience:
(1) The Triumvirate: This was an institution that was run by a trio
of officers (the Executive Committee), none of them a trustee, though
that state's law said that only trustees could be on such committees.
It was "charitable" and thus tax exempt, evinced no interest in filing
detailed required reports, and never was "bothered" by any public
supervisor in many years of operation. The trustees met once or twice
a year for about an hour, heard a brief report by the trio, received a
sketchy financial summary, rarely questioned a thing, and let things
continue thus, so long that the institution's staff spoke of two of the
trio (quite seriously) as "the owners." The management power was re-
posed, in effect, in the two more willful committee members, who used
their power boldly. Ultimately, a threat by the two to ditch the third
member of the committee, plus a claim of supreme power by another
(new) officer, led to an explosion, a sudden flash of attention by the
trustees, introduction of new blood and scrutiny by the board of trustees,
and the end of the power of "the owners." The history of this oper-
ation would fill a fat book that most people would believe to be a fevered
fiction writer's fantasies.
(2) The Boss: An accredited law college in a major city was headed
by a president who was known to the faculty and staff as "The Boss."
He hand picked the trustees from the bench and bar and public offices
of the community, himself being a lawyer and a public official and a big
wheel in his political party. He was in practical effect a one-man owner
and acted as such, while the trustees seemed to rubber stamp the few
things on which he asked their attention. They, too, met once a year,
for a jovial cocktail hour which included a ten minute sketch "report"
on the affairs of the law school. He hired and fired faculty and staff
practically at will, moved his law office and partner into a sumptuous
suite at the school, kept the records of finances, had magnificent per-
sonal offices in the school (which he rarely used, as he also had grand
offices in a municipal building), made his law partner a highly paid
officer too, rode a chauffeured limousine at school expense, drew salaries
for an imaginary staff to do his administrative work, etc. He rarely filed
reports with anybody, but had the Attorney-General as one of his board
of trustees. He died not long ago, very old, very mean, loaded with riches
and honors, and still president and "The Boss." The eulogies of him, in
the public press, were lush, when he went to his reward.
(3) The Medical Society: A certain few medical-specialty practi-
tioners retained me to set up a Blue-Cross-type-organization which
they would head, to obtain for them the benefits of insurance type ac-
tivity without the investment needed for launching an insurance com-
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pany, and without supervision by the State Superintendent of Insur-
ance. I did so (for the hell of it, and a promised later bonus) by mak-
ing a mix of professional and lay members and a neatly will-o-the-wisp-
worded charter and bylaws. Lay members, for a membership fee, got
what amounted to Blue Cross coverage in the specialty involved. The
profits seemed to be so sure, and so large, that several pirates moved
in at once, trying to take over my clients' gravy. One "blew the whistle,"
calling in the Attorney-General and Superintendent of Insurance. I
had warned that a court fight would be certain, but when it loomed
so soon, the gentlemen refused to chip in for a reasonable fee. So I
agreed to consent dissolution of the new corporation.
(4) The Trade Association: One member of a certain trade asso-
ciation retained me, while he was chief officer, to revise the association's
articles and bylaws in such a way as to perpetuate domination by this
member and the group that he spoke for. I set it up for him, and ap-
parently he still runs the association as he sees fit. (Call me any names
that you deem appropriate; as, if I had refused to do what he wanted to
try to do, some other lawyer undoubtedly would have done the job for
him).
(5) The Animal Lovers: A certain "Home For Animals" is oper-
ated by certain people, with branches in several cities in several states.
They specialize in giving and finding homes for animals whose owners
cannot keep them, and who may pay a fee in order to make sure that the
animals are well cared for and placed in good homes. But the oper-
ators take practically all of the animals and sell them. Their operation
has the appearance of a tax exempt society, though it is not tax exempt.
I presently am helping a certain national society to try to end this lucra-
tive operation.
(6) The Improver of The Breed: A man called me recently to guide
him in an enterprise which he had acquired. It was a non-profit organi-
zation dedicated to improving the breed of, and further popularizing,
a certain species of animal. To his astonishment, his operation had been
picked up by the Internal Revenue Service in one of its rare, "scatter-
gun" spot checks. It turned out that, in about 50 years of operation, and
of collecting contributions, fees, etc., it never had been incorporated,
never had obtained tax exemption, and never had filed properly. But it
had been acting as a tax-exempt charitable corporation for half a cen-
tury. The trouble really is not hard to cure, nunc pro tune, by filing
articles of incorporation, tax exemption application, etc. Really; no
sweat.
(7, etc.) I could go on and on. The foregoing examples are no more
horrible than many more that I could mention.
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Conclusion
The New York statute probably will lead to an open season on abuse
of the status and privileges of "non-profit" operation; which already
are being badly abused by many people.
Man is a pretty contradictory animal in his non-profit organization
activities as in his other activities. Some men devote their lives to
altruistic works, but most devote their lives to personal advantage and
enrichment, too often under the cloak of alleged charity and with the
benefits of non-profit status. Use of non-profit status for personal ad-
vantage now is becoming almost the majority rule, rather than the
rare and exceptional case.
In all too many cases the various attorneys-general and legislatures
of the various states don't seem to care.
It is all very sad and disheartening-so depressing that one won-
ders what really can be done about it.
Perhaps the thing to do is to hum the popular song titled "Is That
All There Is?", and then to follow its advice-to break out the booze,
etcetera.
It reminds me of an expression used by youngsters today, when
queried as to what they will do about problems that seem to be in-
soluble.
Their answer is poignant:
"Cry a lot."
Jan. 1971
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss1/67
